I disagree with Phil when he suggests on page 28 that "the difference between perceiving and imagining isn’t important." It is true that we perceive and imagine via our minds (in today's age we can also say "via our brains"). But our imagination is clearly different than what we can distinctly perceive through sensory experience of the physical world. Berkeley's disbelief and denial of the existence of material substance is kind of ridiculous.
I also find it amusing that after hearing Hyl's modern take on how the mind resides in the brain, Phil attempts to say the opposite--that the brain exists in the mind.
1. Hyl keeps trying to make Phil see that maybe matter really exists, as he argues “Although may not be a cause, what blocks it from being an instrument subservient to the supreme agent in the production of our ideas?” (33). Phil tries to make Hyl identify the characteristics of such instrument, but Hyl cannot do it, so Phil argues that maybe Hyl thinks that God cannot act as well without matter. The latter argument does not make sense to me. Why would the existence of matter give God less power? If God created our minds, why would not he create matter in which our minds can exercise, therefore our bodies exist? In my perspective, I believe that the existence of matter would not take away the power of God or a supreme being, if he really exists.
2. Berkeley goes back to his argument for the existence of God in the Third Dialogue. Berkeley argues, “When I say that sensible things can’t exist out of the mind, I don’t mean my mind in particular, but all minds… There is other mind in which they exist during the intervals between the times when I perceive them… It necessarily follows that there is an omnipresent, eternal Mind which knows and comprehends all things, and lets us experience them in a certain manner according to rules that he himself has organized and that we call the ‘laws of nature’.” (42) Therefore, sensible things exist in an eternal mind, and we sense them when the eternal mind (or God) allows us. I think this theory gives great importance to God, as he did not just create all sensible things, but contains all sensible things in his mind. Therefore, he has the entire control of what we will sense. As a result, God did not create matter, but rather created the mind and sensations.
I find it very interesting when Hyl's brings up the possibility that matter could be the cause of our ideas. The idea that particles could go through motion or something to produce ideas, is very interesting to me.Phil's argument that the only thing that is active in the world is ones will, is very strange.In my opinion I do think the will is active however I also think the mind can have active thoughts, as well as the external world is active.
Phil is very against the idea of any opposition that Hyl brings up that questions God and his abilities. I find this very interesting, because it seems as Phil is not ready to listen to any opposition or ideas with the possibility he could be proven wrong.
1. In this discussion, Philonous makes the claim that nothing exists outside of the human mind and that there are only real or imagined ideas. he also says that whether an idea is real or imagined doesn't matter. These ideas include anything that would cause the body to experience sensation, which he claims is not caused by the nerves sending signals to the brain, but by God. So, everything we experience are only ideas in our minds caused by the ideas in God's mind. 2. I find this claim to be pretty narrow minded. This is another example of limiting our understanding of the external world to the human perspective. Although we can only understand our thoughts as human beings, it doesn't make sense to exclude other living beings. Regardless, it's still interesting to think that nothing exists outside of the human mind. I find myself asking a lot of questions regarding Philonous' argument. If it doesn't matter whether an idea is real or imagined, what is the point of distinguishing the two? If our sensations are the real ideas caused by other ideas, and imagined ideas are just the same, and there is no importance in the difference between real or imagined ideas, how can he claim that the two are distinguishable? If everything is caused by ideas in the mind, what is the purpose in something being real or imagined? Don't they both exist in the same sense? If God causes all ideas in the human mind, does he cause ideas in other living things? Or are they also imagined in our minds? Are humans the only things that actually exist? Do our bodies exist or are we just minds (spirits)? What would Philonous' world actually be, then? Does something exists if someone is not perceiving it? Why would God only create ideas and the impression of an external world? Are our experiences enough evidence for us to claim whether something exists or not?
1) I liked how in this dialogue, Phil appreciates that there is certain natural beauty and rhythm to be found in nature (page 28). There are small parts that have their own individuality/ends but they all contribute to the whole, perfectly. 2) Berkeley in the third dialogue introduces a concept of spiritual substance. This concept is really different from the other substances we had been learning about before, because the idea of this substance rejects the idea of material/ physical substance in all manifestations, since matter is really only a perception of the mind.
1. An important part in this reading was when Phil asked Hyl, "To put it bluntly, can you expect this scepticism of yours not to be thought extravagantly absurd by all reasonable people?" (29) I found this passage to be of importance because this is said after Phil goes on a long rant concerning the senses and imagination. Phil claims that there is some secret mechanism out there that links the whole system of the world together. Phil believes the whole system is more amazing than we can say or think. Here Phil is defending his idealist views by questioning Hylas's realism views, in which gets rid of the senses. 2. Another passage in which we are able to see Phil idealist views is when he states, "But we don’t believe the same thing. Philosophers hold that God perceives all corporeal things, but they attribute to such things an absolute existence independently of their being perceived by any mind whatever; and I don’t" (Berkeley 30) I liked this passage because it helped me understand the difference between this two metaphysical debates. Idealist believe that sensible things exist, while realism simplifies its metaphysical commits and gets rid of the senses. The dialogue between these two characters is allowing me to understand Lockes' and Berkeleys' theories.
1.) I am wondering here if the idealists are trying to have their cake and eat it too. It seems that every time an idealist attempts to answer the question of the external world they are forced to postulate some kind of universal mind. It seems as if this postulation sounds suspiciously like posting the existence of a material world.
2.) This use of the idea of God as the universal mind reminds me of the contemporary idealist notion that we exist in a simulation. It is interesting to see how these early modern ideas continue to exist today in different forms.
1. It was interesting to read this section of the discussion between Hylas and Philonous. At the outset, Hylas states a possibility that is found frequently in our discussion on epistemology and metaphysics thus far. Namely, that the extended world (or matter) acts upon our sense organs to cause our perceptions. The second dialogue then continues on this topic through a number of iterations in which Hylas changes his premises while maintaining this same main idea and Philonous continually striking down each argument.
2. On page 57 I thought Hylas made a really solid point against Philonous. He says something along the lines of how in the Bible it states that God created the universe then after that he created man. Therefore, how could it be that all that exists are mental images when a material universe must have been created before mental images exists. Philonous then refutes this by saying that these images did exists, they just didn't exist in the mind of human but I thought that this was a really interesting argument that was made.
After the end of our discussion last week I cant shake the idea that matter is unnecessary (if one assumes God) because it clutters up the theory. This week in the readings I found myself more on the side of Philonous than Hylas. Considering I didn't agree with his position at all last week and thought it was ridiculous, this surprised me. Although I will say the caveat that one needs to accept God for ANY of this to make sense is present in my mind as a point of weakness in this argument that could serve to undermine it when it comes face to face with other, more recent. theories.
Also I can't articulate it perfectly, but these dialogues make me think of Nagel's "What is it like to be a bat?" While Nagel is saying (roughly) that you cant know what it like to be a bat, you could only at best know what it is like for a human to be a bat, Berkeley is saying a similar idea. You can't know anything about the world, you can only know about how your mind experiences the world.
1. "Don’t all instruments have this in common: they are used only in doing things that can’t be performed by the mere act of our wills?" I believe passages like this anticipate the Kantian theory that all knowledge ends up becoming pragmatic, although idealists here want to admit it or not.
2. When Phil discusses the mediation between the senses and reality, it makes me think of Locke who comes close to doubt whether our senses actually do act as some mediator of objective knowledge. For what is the mediator if the not the senses itself?
I disagree with Phil when he suggests on page 28 that "the difference between perceiving and imagining isn’t important." It is true that we perceive and imagine via our minds (in today's age we can also say "via our brains"). But our imagination is clearly different than what we can distinctly perceive through sensory experience of the physical world. Berkeley's disbelief and denial of the existence of material substance is kind of ridiculous.
ReplyDeleteI also find it amusing that after hearing Hyl's modern take on how the mind resides in the brain, Phil attempts to say the opposite--that the brain exists in the mind.
1. Hyl keeps trying to make Phil see that maybe matter really exists, as he argues “Although may not be a cause, what blocks it from being an instrument subservient to the supreme agent in the production of our ideas?” (33). Phil tries to make Hyl identify the characteristics of such instrument, but Hyl cannot do it, so Phil argues that maybe Hyl thinks that God cannot act as well without matter. The latter argument does not make sense to me. Why would the existence of matter give God less power? If God created our minds, why would not he create matter in which our minds can exercise, therefore our bodies exist? In my perspective, I believe that the existence of matter would not take away the power of God or a supreme being, if he really exists.
ReplyDelete2. Berkeley goes back to his argument for the existence of God in the Third Dialogue. Berkeley argues, “When I say that sensible things can’t exist out of the mind, I don’t mean my mind in particular, but all minds… There is other mind in which they exist during the intervals between the times when I perceive them… It necessarily follows that there is an omnipresent, eternal Mind which knows and comprehends all things, and lets us experience them in a certain manner according to rules that he himself has organized and that we call the ‘laws of nature’.” (42) Therefore, sensible things exist in an eternal mind, and we sense them when the eternal mind (or God) allows us. I think this theory gives great importance to God, as he did not just create all sensible things, but contains all sensible things in his mind. Therefore, he has the entire control of what we will sense. As a result, God did not create matter, but rather created the mind and sensations.
I find it very interesting when Hyl's brings up the possibility that matter could be the cause of our ideas. The idea that particles could go through motion or something to produce ideas, is very interesting to me.Phil's argument that the only thing that is active in the world is ones will, is very strange.In my opinion I do think the will is active however I also think the mind can have active thoughts, as well as the external world is active.
ReplyDeletePhil is very against the idea of any opposition that Hyl brings up that questions God and his abilities. I find this very interesting, because it seems as Phil is not ready to listen to any opposition or ideas with the possibility he could be proven wrong.
1. In this discussion, Philonous makes the claim that nothing exists outside of the human mind and that there are only real or imagined ideas. he also says that whether an idea is real or imagined doesn't matter. These ideas include anything that would cause the body to experience sensation, which he claims is not caused by the nerves sending signals to the brain, but by God. So, everything we experience are only ideas in our minds caused by the ideas in God's mind.
ReplyDelete2. I find this claim to be pretty narrow minded. This is another example of limiting our understanding of the external world to the human perspective. Although we can only understand our thoughts as human beings, it doesn't make sense to exclude other living beings. Regardless, it's still interesting to think that nothing exists outside of the human mind. I find myself asking a lot of questions regarding Philonous' argument. If it doesn't matter whether an idea is real or imagined, what is the point of distinguishing the two? If our sensations are the real ideas caused by other ideas, and imagined ideas are just the same, and there is no importance in the difference between real or imagined ideas, how can he claim that the two are distinguishable? If everything is caused by ideas in the mind, what is the purpose in something being real or imagined? Don't they both exist in the same sense? If God causes all ideas in the human mind, does he cause ideas in other living things? Or are they also imagined in our minds? Are humans the only things that actually exist? Do our bodies exist or are we just minds (spirits)? What would Philonous' world actually be, then? Does something exists if someone is not perceiving it? Why would God only create ideas and the impression of an external world? Are our experiences enough evidence for us to claim whether something exists or not?
1) I liked how in this dialogue, Phil appreciates that there is certain natural beauty and rhythm to be found in nature (page 28). There are small parts that have their own individuality/ends but they all contribute to the whole, perfectly.
ReplyDelete2) Berkeley in the third dialogue introduces a concept of spiritual substance. This concept is really different from the other substances we had been learning about before, because the idea of this substance rejects the idea of material/ physical substance in all manifestations, since matter is really only a perception of the mind.
1. An important part in this reading was when Phil asked Hyl, "To put it bluntly, can you expect this scepticism of yours not to be thought extravagantly absurd by all reasonable people?" (29) I found this passage to be of importance because this is said after Phil goes on a long rant concerning the senses and imagination. Phil claims that there is some secret mechanism out there that links the whole system of the world together. Phil believes the whole system is more amazing than we can say or think. Here Phil is defending his idealist views by questioning Hylas's realism views, in which gets rid of the senses.
ReplyDelete2. Another passage in which we are able to see Phil idealist views is when he states, "But we don’t believe the same thing. Philosophers hold that God perceives all corporeal things, but they attribute to such things an absolute existence independently of their being perceived by any mind whatever; and I don’t" (Berkeley 30) I liked this passage because it helped me understand the difference between this two metaphysical debates. Idealist believe that sensible things exist, while realism simplifies its metaphysical commits and gets rid of the senses. The dialogue between these two characters is allowing me to understand Lockes' and Berkeleys' theories.
1.) I am wondering here if the idealists are trying to have their cake and eat it too. It seems that every time an idealist attempts to answer the question of the external world they are forced to postulate some kind of universal mind. It seems as if this postulation sounds suspiciously like posting the existence of a material world.
ReplyDelete2.) This use of the idea of God as the universal mind reminds me of the contemporary idealist notion that we exist in a simulation. It is interesting to see how these early modern ideas continue to exist today in different forms.
1. It was interesting to read this section of the discussion between Hylas and Philonous. At the outset, Hylas states a possibility that is found frequently in our discussion on epistemology and metaphysics thus far. Namely, that the extended world (or matter) acts upon our sense organs to cause our perceptions. The second dialogue then continues on this topic through a number of iterations in which Hylas changes his premises while maintaining this same main idea and Philonous continually striking down each argument.
ReplyDelete2. On page 57 I thought Hylas made a really solid point against Philonous. He says something along the lines of how in the Bible it states that God created the universe then after that he created man. Therefore, how could it be that all that exists are mental images when a material universe must have been created before mental images exists. Philonous then refutes this by saying that these images did exists, they just didn't exist in the mind of human but I thought that this was a really interesting argument that was made.
After the end of our discussion last week I cant shake the idea that matter is unnecessary (if one assumes God) because it clutters up the theory. This week in the readings I found myself more on the side of Philonous than Hylas. Considering I didn't agree with his position at all last week and thought it was ridiculous, this surprised me. Although I will say the caveat that one needs to accept God for ANY of this to make sense is present in my mind as a point of weakness in this argument that could serve to undermine it when it comes face to face with other, more recent. theories.
ReplyDeleteAlso I can't articulate it perfectly, but these dialogues make me think of Nagel's "What is it like to be a bat?" While Nagel is saying (roughly) that you cant know what it like to be a bat, you could only at best know what it is like for a human to be a bat, Berkeley is saying a similar idea. You can't know anything about the world, you can only know about how your mind experiences the world.
1. "Don’t all instruments have this in common: they are used only in doing things that can’t be performed by the mere act of our wills?" I believe passages like this anticipate the Kantian theory that all knowledge ends up becoming pragmatic, although idealists here want to admit it or not.
ReplyDelete2. When Phil discusses the mediation between the senses and reality, it makes me think of Locke who comes close to doubt whether our senses actually do act as some mediator of objective knowledge. For what is the mediator if the not the senses itself?