The very first intro is very intriguing. It is very true that "the illiterate majority of people, who walk the high road of plain common sense and are governed by the dictates of nature, are mostly comfortable and undisturbed. To them nothing that is familiar appears hard to explain or to understand..." Even to this day, it is true. The vast majority of people (the "illiterate" folk that was mentioned) dislike or are disinterested in philosophy. And the majority of people also do in fact live very practically and dependent on senses -- rarely abstract, intellectual thought. The common folk are very complacent and "comfortable" like this, too. So many people love to hate philosophy.
"They don’t complain of any lack of certainty in their senses, and are in no danger of becoming sceptics. But as soon as we depart from sense and instinct to follow the light of a higher principle—i.e. to reason, meditate, and reflect on the nature of things—a thousand doubts spring up in our minds concerning things that we previously seemed to understand fully." The next quote is also very telling. Yeah, it's true that when people stop simply going off of instincts and senses, and start to think intellectually and philosophically, we end up with a lot of abstract thought. Also, skepticism is very important in modern science and critical thinking in general. They say that doubt is a part of integrity, after all. And it is human curiosity, as well, that makes us think.
"Everyone agreesthat the qualitites of things never really exist in isolation from one another; rather, they are mixed and blended together, several in the same object.But, we are told by the supporters of 'abstract ideas', the mind can..."(2). Who is Berkeley referring to? The supporters of abstract ideas, are they people that believe that secondary qualities are just part of the external world?
Berkeley brings up the concept of "abstract ideas" many times in the reading. My understanding of these 'abstract ideas' are that they are secondary qualties? Things that are perceived via our senses, that is not consistent for everyone, because everyones' perception is different.
1. A passage I find of importance in this reading is when Berkeley writes, "My purpose therefore is to try to discover what the underlying sources are of all that doubtfulness and uncertainty, those absurdities and contradictions...thinking that it comes from the natural dullness and limitedness of our faculties." (Berkeley 1) I find this to be important because it is here where Berkeley expresses the purpose of his work. Berkeley has hope he will be able to find the 'truth' but in my opinion, no one, no matter how intelligent they are, will be able to find the underlying source of those aspect which are doubtful to us. 2. Another passage in this reading that stood out to me is when Berkeley writes, "So we can reasonably conclude that if there are any abstract ideas they are all in the minds of learned people." (Berkeley 4) Here, Berkeley defends his idealism views by recognizing that there is not just one idea which represents something. Berkeley gives the example of a human; a human can be white, black, tall, short, and so on, there isn't is one particular idea. With that, abstract ideas are just in the mind.
1. Berkeley's rational logic rests upon the notion that what cannot be perceived cannot be proven to exist, so that even the famous thought experiment of imagining a tree when nobody is there still doesn't verify the notion that that object does exist outside the mind (p. 16, sec. 23).
2. Berkeley does posit, like Locke, that senses are trusted mediators between ideas and reality but only by God can these senses have any affect of idea within us (p. 19).
1. It was interesting to read Locke’s perspective about abstract ideas while having Berkeley explain what he thinks about those ideas. Berkeley agrees that brutes do not have the capacity for abstraction. Nevertheless, he does not believe that there are general abstract ideas, as “An idea, which considered in itself is particular, becomes general in its meaning by being made to represent or stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort of itself…” (5) He believes that abstract ideas are too difficult to be necessary for communication, therefore there cannot be general abstract ideas because they are not needed for the growth of knowledge. Moreover, he does not think they are as important as other philosophers believed, for he does not think they should determine all ideas nor language.
2. Berkeley goes back to his idea that everything that exists, exists in the mind. He explains, “For unthinking things, to exist is to be perceived; so they couldn’t possibly exist out of the minds or thinking things that perceive them.” (11) Therefore, if I stand up and leave, the chair I am on right now would cease to exist, for there is no one to perceive it and its existence depends on my perception.
Some sections of the introduction make me wonder if there is some genealogy between Berkeley and phenomenology that would arise in the early 1800s in Hegel. I feel like I recognize a similarity is the way Hegel focuses on the nature of reality through experience and perception. I don’t remember enough of Hegel to know if he posited a mind independent reality, but if what I do remember is correct, he certainly wouldn’t have found a mind independent world as important as the mind dependent experience of phenomena.
I am comfortable conceding Berkeley’s examples and thought experiments, as I cannot imagine a perceptible idea that is not being perceived because in my very imagining them I am the perceiver. But I wonder what the cause of my ideas is. If I am capable of seeing a tree in a park, and capable of imagining a tree in the park, what differentiates the two experiences? Sense and imagination naturally, but what is it that sense refers to that imagination does not if not an external reality? I feel like we have talked about this in class already but for the life of me I cannot remember or find it in my notes.
1.) Since I found myself defecting to the rationalist nation I have wanted to vehemently disagree with Berkeley. However, if I give his epistemology for the sake of the initial conditions for the argument I have no choice but respect the point about the limits of human knowledge in the context of empiricist epistemology. "It is indeed widely believed that all perceptible objects— houses, mountains, rivers, and so on—really exist independently of being perceived by the understanding. But however widely and confidently this belief may be held, anyone who has the courage to challenge it will—if I’m not mistaken—see that it involves an obvious contradiction. For what are houses, mountains, rivers etc. but things we perceive by sense?"
2.) It does seem as if Berkeley's attack on Locke's notions of limited realism do challenge the empirical 'purist'. If one is indeed an empiricist in the full sense of the word it seems as if one must have to doubt the existence of a material world. In this regard Berkeley is completely right, but only in so far as we accept the epistemological point of empiricism as a starting condition for the argument.
1. In his introduction, Berkeley is purporting that one of the main reason's that human's often come into error or confusion about the world - or at least their understanding of it - is because it is often assumed that human's are capable of forming abstract ideas of the world. Berkeley states, however, that humans are not actually capable of this, despite the popular belief. As he states, "I need especially to attend to a doctrine that seems to have played a large part in making people's theories complex and confusing, and to have caused endless bettors to the theory that the mind has a power of forming abstract ideas or notions of things."
2. Berkeley then goes on to clarify what he means by the above passage over the next few pages. He states that while people are not capable of forming abstract ideas of things, they are capable, however, of forming general ideas of things. Berkeley states that we form general notions of that we take from commonalities that we find in the particulars. However, these generalizations are not actually able to exist outside of these particulars and on their own they do not have existence.
The very first intro is very intriguing. It is very true that "the illiterate majority of people, who walk the high road of plain common sense and are governed by the dictates of nature, are mostly comfortable and undisturbed. To them nothing that is familiar appears hard to explain or to understand..." Even to this day, it is true. The vast majority of people (the "illiterate" folk that was mentioned) dislike or are disinterested in philosophy. And the majority of people also do in fact live very practically and dependent on senses -- rarely abstract, intellectual thought. The common folk are very complacent and "comfortable" like this, too. So many people love to hate philosophy.
ReplyDelete"They don’t complain of any lack of certainty in their senses, and are in no danger of becoming sceptics. But as soon as we depart from sense and instinct to follow the light of a
higher principle—i.e. to reason, meditate, and reflect on the nature of things—a thousand doubts spring up in our minds concerning things that we previously seemed to understand fully." The next quote is also very telling. Yeah, it's true that when people stop simply going off of instincts and senses, and start to think intellectually and philosophically, we end up with a lot of abstract thought. Also, skepticism is very important in modern science and critical thinking in general. They say that doubt is a part of integrity, after all. And it is human curiosity, as well, that makes us think.
"Everyone agreesthat the qualitites of things never really exist in isolation from one another; rather, they are mixed and blended together, several in the same object.But, we are told by the supporters of 'abstract ideas', the mind can..."(2). Who is Berkeley referring to? The supporters of abstract ideas, are they people that believe that secondary qualities are just part of the external world?
ReplyDeleteBerkeley brings up the concept of "abstract ideas" many times in the reading. My understanding of these 'abstract ideas' are that they are secondary qualties? Things that are perceived via our senses, that is not consistent for everyone, because everyones' perception is different.
1. A passage I find of importance in this reading is when Berkeley writes, "My purpose therefore is to try to discover what the underlying sources are of all that doubtfulness and uncertainty, those absurdities and contradictions...thinking that it comes from the natural dullness and limitedness of our faculties." (Berkeley 1) I find this to be important because it is here where Berkeley expresses the purpose of his work. Berkeley has hope he will be able to find the 'truth' but in my opinion, no one, no matter how intelligent they are, will be able to find the underlying source of those aspect which are doubtful to us.
ReplyDelete2. Another passage in this reading that stood out to me is when Berkeley writes, "So we can reasonably conclude that if there are any abstract ideas they are all in the minds of learned people." (Berkeley 4) Here, Berkeley defends his idealism views by recognizing that there is not just one idea which represents something. Berkeley gives the example of a human; a human can be white, black, tall, short, and so on, there isn't is one particular idea. With that, abstract ideas are just in the mind.
1. Berkeley's rational logic rests upon the notion that what cannot be perceived cannot be proven to exist, so that even the famous thought experiment of imagining a tree when nobody is there still doesn't verify the notion that that object does exist outside the mind (p. 16, sec. 23).
ReplyDelete2. Berkeley does posit, like Locke, that senses are trusted mediators between ideas and reality but only by God can these senses have any affect of idea within us (p. 19).
1. It was interesting to read Locke’s perspective about abstract ideas while having Berkeley explain what he thinks about those ideas. Berkeley agrees that brutes do not have the capacity for abstraction. Nevertheless, he does not believe that there are general abstract ideas, as “An idea, which considered in itself is particular, becomes general in its meaning by being made to represent or stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort of itself…” (5) He believes that abstract ideas are too difficult to be necessary for communication, therefore there cannot be general abstract ideas because they are not needed for the growth of knowledge. Moreover, he does not think they are as important as other philosophers believed, for he does not think they should determine all ideas nor language.
ReplyDelete2. Berkeley goes back to his idea that everything that exists, exists in the mind. He explains, “For unthinking things, to exist is to be perceived; so they couldn’t possibly exist out of the minds or thinking things that perceive them.” (11) Therefore, if I stand up and leave, the chair I am on right now would cease to exist, for there is no one to perceive it and its existence depends on my perception.
Some sections of the introduction make me wonder if there is some genealogy between Berkeley and phenomenology that would arise in the early 1800s in Hegel. I feel like I recognize a similarity is the way Hegel focuses on the nature of reality through experience and perception. I don’t remember enough of Hegel to know if he posited a mind independent reality, but if what I do remember is correct, he certainly wouldn’t have found a mind independent world as important as the mind dependent experience of phenomena.
ReplyDeleteI am comfortable conceding Berkeley’s examples and thought experiments, as I cannot imagine a perceptible idea that is not being perceived because in my very imagining them I am the perceiver. But I wonder what the cause of my ideas is. If I am capable of seeing a tree in a park, and capable of imagining a tree in the park, what differentiates the two experiences? Sense and imagination naturally, but what is it that sense refers to that imagination does not if not an external reality? I feel like we have talked about this in class already but for the life of me I cannot remember or find it in my notes.
1.) Since I found myself defecting to the rationalist nation I have wanted to vehemently disagree with Berkeley. However, if I give his epistemology for the sake of the initial conditions for the argument I have no choice but respect the point about the limits of human knowledge in the context of empiricist epistemology. "It is indeed widely believed that all perceptible objects— houses, mountains, rivers, and so on—really exist independently of being perceived by the understanding. But however widely and confidently this belief may be held, anyone who has the courage to challenge it will—if I’m not mistaken—see that it involves an obvious contradiction. For what are houses, mountains, rivers etc. but things we perceive by sense?"
ReplyDelete2.) It does seem as if Berkeley's attack on Locke's notions of limited realism do challenge the empirical 'purist'. If one is indeed an empiricist in the full sense of the word it seems as if one must have to doubt the existence of a material world. In this regard Berkeley is completely right, but only in so far as we accept the epistemological point of empiricism as a starting condition for the argument.
1. In his introduction, Berkeley is purporting that one of the main reason's that human's often come into error or confusion about the world - or at least their understanding of it - is because it is often assumed that human's are capable of forming abstract ideas of the world. Berkeley states, however, that humans are not actually capable of this, despite the popular belief. As he states, "I need especially to attend to a doctrine that seems to have played a large part in making people's theories complex and confusing, and to have caused endless bettors to the theory that the mind has a power of forming abstract ideas or notions of things."
ReplyDelete2. Berkeley then goes on to clarify what he means by the above passage over the next few pages. He states that while people are not capable of forming abstract ideas of things, they are capable, however, of forming general ideas of things. Berkeley states that we form general notions of that we take from commonalities that we find in the particulars. However, these generalizations are not actually able to exist outside of these particulars and on their own they do not have existence.