1) There is a distinction made on page 10 in the dialogue between Philonous and Hylas. Philonous deduces that what we receive from our senses is only 'appearant'. This was kind of thought-provoking because really, every thing is so relative. As given in the example, a cloud that looks red or blue will look a completely different color when viewed at a closer distance. The appearant color would mean whatever color appeared to the naked human eye at that time, which doesn't actually exist. 2) All through out my education, I thought that there was a clear distinction in perception and the 'scientific side' of things. Philonous and Hylas give the example on page 9 of sound. Hylas argues that sound can either be a sensation perceived by the mind or a vibration in the air. Philonous replies by saying it would be absurd to think that there would be sound coming through a different sense (motion). I am wondering to what extent this would negate science / scientific beliefs if there were no basis for the true existence of sight/sound/taste/touch/smell? Probably all of it. Would science be just an exercise of our minds/ perceptions?
I found this bit by Hyl really interesting: "...Because intense heat is nothing but a particular kind of painful sensation, and pain can’t exist except in a perceiving being, it follows that no intense heat can really exist in an unperceiving corporeal substance. But that’s no reason for denying that less intense heat can exist in such a substance."
In terms of modern physics, we know that heat is energy and it can certainly exist in something that is an "unperceiving corporeal substance" such as, let's say, a rock. But yes, it does take a sentient organism to be able to sense/perceive pain from intense heat...or any pain at all, for that matter. Philonous also suggests that a less intense heat--warmth--is also something that is only reserved for thinking substances. If by "thinking substances" he means sentient organisms capable of sensation/perception, then I'd say he is still on the money here.
1. I found it interesting in reading though Philonous’ and Hylas’ dialogue how they went about debating the existence of substances. Philonous’ casually asserts that he believes that things perceived only exist in the mind and while at the same time Hylas’ is attempting to refute this by stating that these things must also exist outside of the mind as well. 2. When Philonous used the water bowl example on page 6 to make Hylas backtrack his argument, I found it very compelling. He uses the principle of noncontradiction to assert that the bowl of water cannot be at the same time hot and cold. However, if someone were to stick both there hand in the bowl while one hand is hot and the other hand is cold, then the bowl would appear to be both hot and cold at the same time. Therefore, the sensation of hotness and coldness must only belong in the mind. Since the object itself cannot have both of these principles at the same time due to the law of noncontradiction.
It was interesting to read that Berkeley being an empiricist and arguing that all knowledge comes directly through sensory experience, that with whatever the individual experiences fundamentally involve pain and pleasure that is associated with the eternal piece. The idea of all of our secondary qualities being associated with pain and pleasure seems very iffy to me.
I find it interesting that Berkeley's theory seems to be that real things are just a huge collection of sensations. I feel as this is very broad and would only pertain to tangible objects and nothing associated with knowledge or intangible abstract concepts.
1. The set up of this reading is a dialogue between Philonous and Hylas, in which I found rather fun to read. A quote from Philionous I found of importance is when he states, " I seriously believe that there is no such thing as what philosophers call ‘material substance'"(Berkeley 1) Since we have been discussing other philosophers ideas of substances I find it interesting that Phil rejects the idea of a material substance.
2.Both Phil and Hyl agree on what sensible things are when Phil states, "We agree, then, that sensible things include only things that are immediately perceived by sense." (Berkeley 3) They later go on to discuss that sensible things are just made up of sensible qualities. I am wondering what sensible qualities are though?
1. I honestly did not like this reading. It reminded me lot of Plato's writings. He wrote in dialogues as well. I thought was a bit confusing. In Plato's writing's, he stated who were the speakers in the dialogue. Who were the speakers? This was not made very clear.
2. When Philonous asked Hylas is light a substance, I thought this was very odd question. Light is a substance. Without light, everything in the world would be in darkness. We need light in order to see, for warmth, and for sunshine. Asking if light is a substance, to me was an unnecessary question.
1) I enjoy the set up of this reading versus the others. Dialogues are always more entertaining because of the interaction between characters. I find their conversation about sensible qualities to be very intriguing. Phil explains that sensible qualities cannot exist outside the mind, for something is sensible if you can see it. But there are things that exist that we cannot sense, in==according to this argument those things just do not exist. 2) When Phil argues that everything is made for a particular except for motion and extendedness because you cannot separate the two from secondary qualities, i am not completely sure what he means. Motion happens outside the body to thinking and unthinking substances. It should be able to exist outside the body.
1. For Berkeley, primary and secondary qualities are mind-dependent. He uses Philonous to explain to Hyl what he believes by using fire and heat as an example, by proving that pain nor pleasure is in the object, therefore heat is not in the fire. The material substances are senseless, therefore all senses and perceptions come from the individuals. Hyle believed that the material substance had the sensible qualities inhering in it. “Whatever degree of heat we perceive by sense we can be sure exists also in the object that occasions it.” (4). Nevertheless, from Berkeley’s point of view, both the pain and heat are perceived and come from the mind.
2. When reading Berkeley’s arguments about the senses such as touch (by using warmth and heat), smell (odours), taste (sweet and bitterness); I thought about what he meant, and I certainly understand his point. Nevertheless, I kind of agree with Hyl. Having the perception of a thing, does not follow that the thing does not exist or is not inherited in the object. Although one person might like some tastes and dislike others, that does not necessarily follow that the tastes of the food are not in the food but depend on the person. Does that mean that food does not taste like anything and is actually the person who through his senses obtains the flavor of it? So if someone drinks orange juice after brushing his teeth, that means that the orange juice is not actually sweet but bitter for the person’s perception when he/she tastes it? Why would sweetness or bitterness not be a part of the orange juice? What about the components of orange juice? It is proven that the molecular composition of orange juice is multiple organic acids, sugars, and phenolic compounds. Such acids are citric, malic and ascorbic. The orange itself is acid, and the sugar is what obscures the acids to make it sweet for people. Does that mean that one can eat an orange that is supposed to be acid and taste it as sweet although it has no sugar because the taste is not actually in the orange but rather in the person’s perception?
I don’t have much context for Berkeley, but his choice to address issues of reality in the form of a dialogue makes his writing come across as somewhat satirical. Philonous essentially begins by accusing Hylas of being self contradictory because of his belief in matter. I imagine that Berkeley intended for his readers to identify more with Hyl. at the beginning and be persuaded of Phil.’s argument. But it is presented so plainly in dialogue, that I cant help but wonder if Berkeley thought embracing Plato’s structure and emulating the tone Plato gives to Socrates, gives the reader the sense that they ought to listen to Phil. or else they would be left in the dark like Socrates’ more resistant interlocutors.
While I am not prepared to mount a full scale argument against Berkeley, to say I am cautious about his idealism would be putting it mildly. I’m concerned that the implications of (the admittedly vulgar interpretation) “all things are made up of the ideas we have of them” is that there is no external world, and therefore no corespondent truth. A lack of corespondent truth leaves a void that will almost certainly be filled with an inferior definition of truth, that is, provided that there actually IS and external world, less true.
1) There is a distinction made on page 10 in the dialogue between Philonous and Hylas. Philonous deduces that what we receive from our senses is only 'appearant'. This was kind of thought-provoking because really, every thing is so relative. As given in the example, a cloud that looks red or blue will look a completely different color when viewed at a closer distance. The appearant color would mean whatever color appeared to the naked human eye at that time, which doesn't actually exist.
ReplyDelete2) All through out my education, I thought that there was a clear distinction in perception and the 'scientific side' of things. Philonous and Hylas give the example on page 9 of sound. Hylas argues that sound can either be a sensation perceived by the mind or a vibration in the air. Philonous replies by saying it would be absurd to think that there would be sound coming through a different sense (motion). I am wondering to what extent this would negate science / scientific beliefs if there were no basis for the true existence of sight/sound/taste/touch/smell? Probably all of it. Would science be just an exercise of our minds/ perceptions?
I found this bit by Hyl really interesting: "...Because intense heat is nothing but a particular kind of painful sensation, and pain can’t exist except in a perceiving being, it follows that no intense heat can really exist in an unperceiving corporeal substance. But that’s no reason for denying that less intense heat can exist in such a substance."
ReplyDeleteIn terms of modern physics, we know that heat is energy and it can certainly exist in something that is an "unperceiving corporeal substance" such as, let's say, a rock. But yes, it does take a sentient organism to be able to sense/perceive pain from intense heat...or any pain at all, for that matter. Philonous also suggests that a less intense heat--warmth--is also something that is only reserved for thinking substances. If by "thinking substances" he means sentient organisms capable of sensation/perception, then I'd say he is still on the money here.
1. I found it interesting in reading though Philonous’ and Hylas’ dialogue how they went about debating the existence of substances. Philonous’ casually asserts that he believes that things perceived only exist in the mind and while at the same time Hylas’ is attempting to refute this by stating that these things must also exist outside of the mind as well.
ReplyDelete2. When Philonous used the water bowl example on page 6 to make Hylas backtrack his argument, I found it very compelling. He uses the principle of noncontradiction to assert that the bowl of water cannot be at the same time hot and cold. However, if someone were to stick both there hand in the bowl while one hand is hot and the other hand is cold, then the bowl would appear to be both hot and cold at the same time. Therefore, the sensation of hotness and coldness must only belong in the mind. Since the object itself cannot have both of these principles at the same time due to the law of noncontradiction.
It was interesting to read that Berkeley being an empiricist and arguing that all knowledge comes directly through sensory experience, that with whatever the individual experiences fundamentally involve pain and pleasure that is associated with the eternal piece. The idea of all of our secondary qualities being associated with pain and pleasure seems very iffy to me.
ReplyDeleteI find it interesting that Berkeley's theory seems to be that real things are just a huge collection of sensations. I feel as this is very broad and would only pertain to tangible objects and nothing associated with knowledge or intangible abstract concepts.
1. The set up of this reading is a dialogue between Philonous and Hylas, in which I found rather fun to read. A quote from Philionous I found of importance is when he states, " I seriously believe that there is no such thing as what philosophers call ‘material substance'"(Berkeley 1) Since we have been discussing other philosophers ideas of substances I find it interesting that Phil rejects the idea of a material substance.
ReplyDelete2.Both Phil and Hyl agree on what sensible things are when Phil states, "We agree, then, that sensible things include only things that are immediately perceived by sense." (Berkeley 3) They later go on to discuss that sensible things are just made up of sensible qualities. I am wondering what sensible qualities are though?
1. I honestly did not like this reading. It reminded me lot of Plato's writings. He wrote in dialogues as well. I thought was a bit confusing. In Plato's writing's, he stated who were the speakers in the dialogue. Who were the speakers? This was not made very clear.
ReplyDelete2. When Philonous asked Hylas is light a substance, I thought this was very odd question. Light is a substance. Without light, everything in the world would be in darkness. We need light in order to see, for warmth, and for sunshine. Asking if light is a substance, to me was an unnecessary question.
1) I enjoy the set up of this reading versus the others. Dialogues are always more entertaining because of the interaction between characters. I find their conversation about sensible qualities to be very intriguing. Phil explains that sensible qualities cannot exist outside the mind, for something is sensible if you can see it. But there are things that exist that we cannot sense, in==according to this argument those things just do not exist.
ReplyDelete2) When Phil argues that everything is made for a particular except for motion and extendedness because you cannot separate the two from secondary qualities, i am not completely sure what he means. Motion happens outside the body to thinking and unthinking substances. It should be able to exist outside the body.
1. For Berkeley, primary and secondary qualities are mind-dependent. He uses Philonous to explain to Hyl what he believes by using fire and heat as an example, by proving that pain nor pleasure is in the object, therefore heat is not in the fire. The material substances are senseless, therefore all senses and perceptions come from the individuals. Hyle believed that the material substance had the sensible qualities inhering in it. “Whatever degree of heat we perceive by sense we can be sure exists also in the object that occasions it.” (4). Nevertheless, from Berkeley’s point of view, both the pain and heat are perceived and come from the mind.
ReplyDelete2. When reading Berkeley’s arguments about the senses such as touch (by using warmth and heat), smell (odours), taste (sweet and bitterness); I thought about what he meant, and I certainly understand his point. Nevertheless, I kind of agree with Hyl. Having the perception of a thing, does not follow that the thing does not exist or is not inherited in the object. Although one person might like some tastes and dislike others, that does not necessarily follow that the tastes of the food are not in the food but depend on the person. Does that mean that food does not taste like anything and is actually the person who through his senses obtains the flavor of it? So if someone drinks orange juice after brushing his teeth, that means that the orange juice is not actually sweet but bitter for the person’s perception when he/she tastes it? Why would sweetness or bitterness not be a part of the orange juice? What about the components of orange juice? It is proven that the molecular composition of orange juice is multiple organic acids, sugars, and phenolic compounds. Such acids are citric, malic and ascorbic. The orange itself is acid, and the sugar is what obscures the acids to make it sweet for people. Does that mean that one can eat an orange that is supposed to be acid and taste it as sweet although it has no sugar because the taste is not actually in the orange but rather in the person’s perception?
I don’t have much context for Berkeley, but his choice to address issues of reality in the form of a dialogue makes his writing come across as somewhat satirical. Philonous essentially begins by accusing Hylas of being self contradictory because of his belief in matter. I imagine that Berkeley intended for his readers to identify more with Hyl. at the beginning and be persuaded of Phil.’s argument. But it is presented so plainly in dialogue, that I cant help but wonder if Berkeley thought embracing Plato’s structure and emulating the tone Plato gives to Socrates, gives the reader the sense that they ought to listen to Phil. or else they would be left in the dark like Socrates’ more resistant interlocutors.
ReplyDeleteWhile I am not prepared to mount a full scale argument against Berkeley, to say I am cautious about his idealism would be putting it mildly. I’m concerned that the implications of (the admittedly vulgar interpretation) “all things are made up of the ideas we have of them” is that there is no external world, and therefore no corespondent truth. A lack of corespondent truth leaves a void that will almost certainly be filled with an inferior definition of truth, that is, provided that there actually IS and external world, less true.