1) On page 19, Leibniz is saying that there are a few 'free primary decrees' that serve as the laws of the universe where they are applicable without God necessarily having to keep up with them in a sense once he has put them in place. He differentiates a free decree of God from an actual decree of God where actual is where God puts into motion a specific thing. Free is still put into action by God but it only follows a general rule instead of being specific like an actual decree. 2) I thought that the Adam theme was interesting in the letters, especially where Leibniz explains through the Adam idea what he means by infinitely many 'Adams' on page 20. He thinks that there must be some predicates about Adam that hold true, but there can still be an infinity that all fit the same predicates. Adam must be 'the first man, placed in a garden of pleasure, and has one of his ribs used by God to make a woman', but other aspects of Adam may differ, and do infinitely. This argument made me think that these predicates Adam holds are his own free decrees of nature. These are general principles of Adam's world and serve as the principles that make Adam Adam, where everything that Adam is/does follows from these predicates, but they are also specific in nature like the actual decrees. Where God says that Adam must have these specific predicates every time.
I liked this quote on page 20: "...the premise from which all human events can be deduced is not simply the proposition that God created a vague Adam, but rather the proposition that God created a particular Adam..." I find it remarkable that theists believe so wholeheartedly in the intelligent design of God, and that the universe was not created from pure randomness like some scientific theories would suggest nowadays. God specifically chose a particular Adam; not just any random Adam on a whim.
"It’s true that we shouldn’t dig too deeply into questions about what God knows and wills, because of the great difficulties they involve..." I wonder if Leibniz and other thinkers during this time were all afraid to doubt God and possibly be called a non-believer/heathen/heretic. Spinoza probably felt this fear, too.
1. In page 19, I liked when Leibniz compared “the idea of a building resulting from the aims or plans of the man who undertakes it” to God’s plans about the world, as this world would be one of the possibilities God had before creating it, just as a person such as an architect would. I think this was a good explanation of the notion of the world and the role that God has in it, as although men is free, according to Leibniz, it is determined by God because God created it. 2. In page 21, I was really interested in Leibniz idea which has the main thought of a man created by God, in which, as God designed him, he knows everything about the man. Moreover, the man himself possesses his attributes and the course of his life practically written in stone, so that the man would be him and would not be confused or change to other individual, as even the minimum change the man experiences in life, was actually predicated by God.
1. A quote I find of interest is when Leibniz writes, "For everything must be explained by its cause, and the cause of the universe is God’s aims." (Leibniz 19) This almost sounds similar to the importance Descartes places on the cause of something. I do also believe that everything happens for a reason and everything can be explained by its cause. 2. One thing I would ask Leibniz is what he means when he writes, "God had perfect knowledge of from all eternity." (Leibniz 21) I think he means that God contains knowledge of everything past, present, future, but the wording of this is confusing to me.
"I think that should dispose of all the doubts, because when I say that the individual notion of Adam contains everything that will ever happen to him, I mean only what all philosophers mean when they say that the predicate is present in the subject of a true proposition," this quote on page 21, I found to be a little confusing. Does Adam hold his own predestined life or a realm that no one can understand?
On page 20 when Leibniz talks about God's idea to create Adam, it almost seems like God knowing the consequences made the decision to create Adam. It also seems as all of God's other decisions are consequences of something bigger, which is a bit confusing for me to digest.
1.) I found it interesting how Leibniz discussed God's creation of Adam and how everything that would happen to him throughout his life was there from the start of his existence. Also, I believe Leibniz was talking about Descartes when he said that it's not enough to sense myself as a thinking substance to distinguish yourself from other people on page 23.
2.) In Leibniz's response to Arnauld, I found it interesting and a little confusing when he states that the souls of lower animals were here since the beginning of the world, while the rational soul is created at the time of when the body is created on page 47. I would think that all souls were either here from the beginning of the world and recycled throughout time or all souls are created fresh at the time of conception.
Correspondences between people in the form of letters are some of my favorite philosophy to read, beacause the arguments must be more concise to clearly address the concerns raised by the other party. While reading Leibniz's notes on Arnauld's letter I got the feeling that Leibniz was playing the conversation exactly how he wanted, and that I, and Arnauld, had been baited into Leibniz's starting premises before I even began reading the finer points of his arguments.
On page 47 Leibniz begins discussing transformation v. creation and i am not sure I am willing to follow him to his logical conclusions, much like I am hesitant to follow Anne Conway to her's.
1) It seems as if Leibniz does not disagree with the idea of a causal chain of events being present in the physical world. However this idea seems to contradict his idea of modality. If everything in existence literally has a soul, some aspect of perception, and a will, how could this causal chain exist? The two ideas seem to be directly contradictory. 2.) Is he making the claim that causal interaction is a complete illusion? That while it looks like objects interact with each other that they never actually do? I am having a very difficult time envisioning this metaphysical scheme it seems very complex and concluded with no apparent practical pay off.
1. "Now each individual substance (according to me) expresses the whole universe in accordance with a certain viewpoint, so it also expresses the miracles I have mentioned." This is an interesting viewpoint as its indications surely point out towards a universe of being. This is a fascinating contrast to the idea of a universe unfolding, and by extension, humans discovering such unfoldings. Rather, Leibniz expresses that there are an infinite set of perceptions.
2. This notion of a substance containing infinite substance has much in common with modern understanding. Namely, that we filter partial or meaningful sensory information while the background information is merely white noise.
1) On page 19, Leibniz is saying that there are a few 'free primary decrees' that serve as the laws of the universe where they are applicable without God necessarily having to keep up with them in a sense once he has put them in place. He differentiates a free decree of God from an actual decree of God where actual is where God puts into motion a specific thing. Free is still put into action by God but it only follows a general rule instead of being specific like an actual decree.
ReplyDelete2) I thought that the Adam theme was interesting in the letters, especially where Leibniz explains through the Adam idea what he means by infinitely many 'Adams' on page 20. He thinks that there must be some predicates about Adam that hold true, but there can still be an infinity that all fit the same predicates. Adam must be 'the first man, placed in a garden of pleasure, and has one of his ribs used by God to make a woman', but other aspects of Adam may differ, and do infinitely. This argument made me think that these predicates Adam holds are his own free decrees of nature. These are general principles of Adam's world and serve as the principles that make Adam Adam, where everything that Adam is/does follows from these predicates, but they are also specific in nature like the actual decrees. Where God says that Adam must have these specific predicates every time.
I liked this quote on page 20: "...the premise from which all human events can be deduced is not simply the proposition that God created a vague Adam, but rather the proposition that God created a particular Adam..." I find it remarkable that theists believe so wholeheartedly in the intelligent design of God, and that the universe was not created from pure randomness like some scientific theories would suggest nowadays. God specifically chose a particular Adam; not just any random Adam on a whim.
ReplyDelete"It’s true that we shouldn’t dig too deeply into questions
about what God knows and wills, because of the great
difficulties they involve..." I wonder if Leibniz and other thinkers during this time were all afraid to doubt God and possibly be called a non-believer/heathen/heretic. Spinoza probably felt this fear, too.
1. In page 19, I liked when Leibniz compared “the idea of a building resulting from the aims or plans of the man who undertakes it” to God’s plans about the world, as this world would be one of the possibilities God had before creating it, just as a person such as an architect would. I think this was a good explanation of the notion of the world and the role that God has in it, as although men is free, according to Leibniz, it is determined by God because God created it.
ReplyDelete2. In page 21, I was really interested in Leibniz idea which has the main thought of a man created by God, in which, as God designed him, he knows everything about the man. Moreover, the man himself possesses his attributes and the course of his life practically written in stone, so that the man would be him and would not be confused or change to other individual, as even the minimum change the man experiences in life, was actually predicated by God.
1. A quote I find of interest is when Leibniz writes, "For everything must be explained by its cause, and the cause of the universe is God’s aims." (Leibniz 19) This almost sounds similar to the importance Descartes places on the cause of something. I do also believe that everything happens for a reason and everything can be explained by its cause.
ReplyDelete2. One thing I would ask Leibniz is what he means when he writes, "God had perfect knowledge of from all eternity." (Leibniz 21) I think he means that God contains knowledge of everything past, present, future, but the wording of this is confusing to me.
"I think that should dispose of all the doubts, because when I say that the individual notion of Adam contains everything that will ever happen to him, I mean only what all philosophers mean when they say that the predicate is present in the subject of a true proposition," this quote on page 21, I found to be a little confusing. Does Adam hold his own predestined life or a realm that no one can understand?
ReplyDeleteOn page 20 when Leibniz talks about God's idea to create Adam, it almost seems like God knowing the consequences made the decision to create Adam. It also seems as all of God's other decisions are consequences of something bigger, which is a bit confusing for me to digest.
1.) I found it interesting how Leibniz discussed God's creation of Adam and how everything that would happen to him throughout his life was there from the start of his existence. Also, I believe Leibniz was talking about Descartes when he said that it's not enough to sense myself as a thinking substance to distinguish yourself from other people on page 23.
ReplyDelete2.) In Leibniz's response to Arnauld, I found it interesting and a little confusing when he states that the souls of lower animals were here since the beginning of the world, while the rational soul is created at the time of when the body is created on page 47. I would think that all souls were either here from the beginning of the world and recycled throughout time or all souls are created fresh at the time of conception.
Correspondences between people in the form of letters are some of my favorite philosophy to read, beacause the arguments must be more concise to clearly address the concerns raised by the other party. While reading Leibniz's notes on Arnauld's letter I got the feeling that Leibniz was playing the conversation exactly how he wanted, and that I, and Arnauld, had been baited into Leibniz's starting premises before I even began reading the finer points of his arguments.
ReplyDeleteOn page 47 Leibniz begins discussing transformation v. creation and i am not sure I am willing to follow him to his logical conclusions, much like I am hesitant to follow Anne Conway to her's.
1) It seems as if Leibniz does not disagree with the idea of a causal chain of events being present in the physical world. However this idea seems to contradict his idea of modality. If everything in existence literally has a soul, some aspect of perception, and a will, how could this causal chain exist? The two ideas seem to be directly contradictory.
ReplyDelete2.) Is he making the claim that causal interaction is a complete illusion? That while it looks like objects interact with each other that they never actually do? I am having a very difficult time envisioning this metaphysical scheme it seems very complex and concluded with no apparent practical pay off.
1. "Now each individual
ReplyDeletesubstance (according to me) expresses the whole universe
in accordance with a certain viewpoint, so it also expresses
the miracles I have mentioned." This is an interesting viewpoint as its indications surely point out towards a universe of being. This is a fascinating contrast to the idea of a universe unfolding, and by extension, humans discovering such unfoldings. Rather, Leibniz expresses that there are an infinite set of perceptions.
2. This notion of a substance containing infinite substance has much in common with modern understanding. Namely, that we filter partial or meaningful sensory information while the background information is merely white noise.