1. Understanding Leibniz's conception of monad and the principle that human being are made up of millions of tiny monads which are living things that somehow incorporate God and the entirety of the universe into them has been unclear at best. However, on page 8 - point 48, when Leibniz is explaining God's intrinsic qualities of power, knowledge, and will -- and how each of these things have a corresponding property in the monad of its basic nature, faculty of perception, and faculty of appetite -- that sort of helped me better understand Liebniz conception and how God and the universe is reflected in these monads.
2. In reading Newtons conceptions of his great laws of gravity and the conservation of motion and of things of this like I found myself questioning why it was that he felt he needed to have the conception of a God that controlled or created all of this. If he had worked out the Mathematical principles in which to support and explain his great theories why did he need to say that these principles work in a rational way because they were created by a rational mind? It seems like his argument would be one to support a metaphysical conception of the world that did not need the notion of God, but instead he takes this rational conception and puts God on the forefront as if it necessitated this sort of creator.
1. Leibniz explains that God exists by stating, “the ultimate reason for things must be in a necessary substance which we call ‘God’ (6). He explains that the necessary substance is a sufficient reason of his own existence, which means that he exists for himself. Moreover, Leibniz continues explaining that God is perfect because of “the total amount of positive reality it contains” (6), and believes that the monads are not perfect because although God creates them (us), their (our) nature does not allow us to be perfect. 2. According to Leibniz, some monads are more perfect than others, as they all possess qualities that make them different from one another, which allows them to act on the other. (8) Nevertheless, God is who decides the act as he created the monads. So he finds that x monad must act on y monad when he thinks its the right time for he knows it all.
1) Section 64 in Leibniz's reading reminded me a lot about the modern day and our technological developments. He says on page 9 "Thus every organized body of a living thing is a kind of divine machine or natural automation. It infinitely surpasses any artificial automaton, because a man-made machine isn't a machine in every one of its parts." We are now making robots that people are starting to anthropomorphize and are very similar to but here is a clear argument that really, a man-made machine could never come to be made up of what humans are made of in at the singular structure. I think what he is saying is that we are divine machines in the sense that we contain correspondence with the entire universe within us, whereas man-made machines do not. 2)From the same quotation, I also wondered if the term divine machine was similar in concept to Descartes' mechanical philosophy of nature, if Leibniz shares the same view.
I found this bit to be very interesting: "It also follows that created things get their perfections from the influence of God, but derive their imperfections from their own natures. Their natures have to have limits, for that is what distinguishes them from God." This, inadvertently or not, shifts the blame of imperfection from God and onto our own selves.
"If you see a pond from a certain distance, you may see the swirling of the fish without being able to pick out any individual fish; it may seem to you that you are seeing confused movements of the fish, but really nothing is confused in itself—what’s happening here is that you are perceiving confusedly." This makes sense. Optical illusions are clear examples of the potential weakness in our perceptions.
1. A quote I found of interest in this reading is when Leibniz writes," Memory provides souls with a kind of following from which mimics reason but must be distinguished from it." (Leibniz 5) He explains how if you show a dog a stick, in which once hurt him, when he sees that stick he will remember it hurt him and run away. I found this to be very true. There are many times were a human is triggered from a particular object or event because it reminds them of a past pain. In this way, since I have been in two car accidents, driving now scares me, the memory of my accidents comes up every time I drive.
2.The last sentence Leibniz writes in this reading is my favorite in this passage, it states, "but also as our master and final cause, who should be the entire goal of our wills, and who alone can make us happy." (Leibniz 13) I agree with this very much so. People try and find happiness in material goods or other people and often end up disappointed. In my opinion, like Leibniz, I believe God alone can make us happy.
Leibniz calling monads "simple substance" almost seems contradicting. Monads are made of smaller substances and are complex, from what I have understood throughout the readings thus far. I thought all monads would be the same yet Leibniz does state that some monads are more perfect because of the qualities they possess.
When reading Newtons' Principia, I found it odd that he was trying to justify mathematical means, however still trying to correlate it in some way to God and having that idea that God almost is in control of everything. Wouldn't mathematical development just stand on its own if the foundation is strong enough? Why involve the idea of God?
1.) Since idealism is so different from the way I currently find myself thinking about the universe I was having hard time creating Leibniz's grand vision of substance. It seems as though he is making an assertion that all things are composed of momads which are quasi mathematical indivisible points composed of no constitute parts. That are differentiated from each other from their limited perceptions of the infinite totality that is within themselves.
2.) While this view is without doubt a very beautiful view of the universe it comes with some substantial baggage. The idea that you have to go outside of contingencies in order to find the 'ultimate reason' seems kind of dangerous. I would wager that more people have died in the name of a Telos than from any other cause of inter-species violence. For this reason it seems that adopting a Telos would be very impractical in the event that the theory is put into action.
1. In the beginning of Leibniz's Monadology, I was little confused. He begins with stating a monad is just a simple substance that does not have any parts. Then he states, "Something that has no parts can't be extended, can't have a shape, and can't be split up. So monads are true atoms of nature - the elements out of which everything is made" (Leibniz 1). This doesn't make any sense, you can split an atom so why did state that you cannot if it is a true atom?
2. As a mathematics major, reading anything by Isaac Newton is an absolute honor. Towards the end of Principia Newton states" As in mathematics, so in natural philosophy, the investigation of difficult things by the method of analysis ought ever to proceed the method of composition" (Newton 13). When you are trying to solve the different particles in space or in nature, the size and density are relative. We have similar problems that we have to solve in mathematics.
1) I understand Leibinz explanation Of what monads are. He explains how no two monads are different because if there were no distinction between anything, nothing would have an actual form. When explain what he believes the soul is, I am a little confused. He explains the soul as monads accompanied by memory. But im not sure what he means by that. Memory of what?, memory of past lives. Because Lebiniz does explain that monads can not be created they simply came into existence. So how old can your soul be? 2) I do not think his argument for God is strong enough either. Similar Descartes, Leibinz uses Mathematics to argue his point. But the idea of God is so abstract, there it cannot be solved in a two step equation. There are always questions left unanswered and again like Descartes, he does not clarify much.
1)I find Boyle's argument that philosophy can not tell us about minds pretty valuable from a utilitarian point of view anyway. I think boyle would agree that the discussion of minds has over complicated and fragmented philosophy. Although he doesn't outright disagree with the notion of a ‘mind’ separate from matter I can appreciate his want to bring philosophy closer to earth and ultimately closer to science. 2)When reading Boyle’s praise of a mechanical philosophy I couldn’t help but feel that aristotle had been reborn and evolved within a new era. Much of Boyle is taking up the torch that aristotle first lit in his creation of many of the natural sciences. Like Aristotle Boyle seems to argue from a point of practicality while never really fighting against or trying to disprove other theories.
1. Understanding Leibniz's conception of monad and the principle that human being are made up of millions of tiny monads which are living things that somehow incorporate God and the entirety of the universe into them has been unclear at best. However, on page 8 - point 48, when Leibniz is explaining God's intrinsic qualities of power, knowledge, and will -- and how each of these things have a corresponding property in the monad of its basic nature, faculty of perception, and faculty of appetite -- that sort of helped me better understand Liebniz conception and how God and the universe is reflected in these monads.
ReplyDelete2. In reading Newtons conceptions of his great laws of gravity and the conservation of motion and of things of this like I found myself questioning why it was that he felt he needed to have the conception of a God that controlled or created all of this. If he had worked out the Mathematical principles in which to support and explain his great theories why did he need to say that these principles work in a rational way because they were created by a rational mind? It seems like his argument would be one to support a metaphysical conception of the world that did not need the notion of God, but instead he takes this rational conception and puts God on the forefront as if it necessitated this sort of creator.
1. Leibniz explains that God exists by stating, “the ultimate reason for things must be in a necessary substance which we call ‘God’ (6). He explains that the necessary substance is a sufficient reason of his own existence, which means that he exists for himself. Moreover, Leibniz continues explaining that God is perfect because of “the total amount of positive reality it contains” (6), and believes that the monads are not perfect because although God creates them (us), their (our) nature does not allow us to be perfect.
ReplyDelete2. According to Leibniz, some monads are more perfect than others, as they all possess qualities that make them different from one another, which allows them to act on the other. (8) Nevertheless, God is who decides the act as he created the monads. So he finds that x monad must act on y monad when he thinks its the right time for he knows it all.
1) Section 64 in Leibniz's reading reminded me a lot about the modern day and our technological developments. He says on page 9 "Thus every organized body of a living thing is a kind of divine machine or natural automation. It infinitely surpasses any artificial automaton, because a man-made machine isn't a machine in every one of its parts." We are now making robots that people are starting to anthropomorphize and are very similar to but here is a clear argument that really, a man-made machine could never come to be made up of what humans are made of in at the singular structure. I think what he is saying is that we are divine machines in the sense that we contain correspondence with the entire universe within us, whereas man-made machines do not.
ReplyDelete2)From the same quotation, I also wondered if the term divine machine was similar in concept to Descartes' mechanical philosophy of nature, if Leibniz shares the same view.
I found this bit to be very interesting: "It also follows that created things get their perfections from the influence of God, but derive their imperfections from their own natures. Their natures have to have limits, for that is what distinguishes them from God." This, inadvertently or not, shifts the blame of imperfection from God and onto our own selves.
ReplyDelete"If you see a pond from a certain distance, you may see the swirling of the fish without being able to pick out any individual fish; it may seem to you that you are seeing confused movements of the fish, but really nothing is confused in itself—what’s happening here is that you are perceiving confusedly." This makes sense. Optical illusions are clear examples of the potential weakness in our perceptions.
1. A quote I found of interest in this reading is when Leibniz writes," Memory provides souls with a kind of following from which mimics reason but must be distinguished from it." (Leibniz 5) He explains how if you show a dog a stick, in which once hurt him, when he sees that stick he will remember it hurt him and run away. I found this to be very true. There are many times were a human is triggered from a particular object or event because it reminds them of a past pain. In this way, since I have been in two car accidents, driving now scares me, the memory of my accidents comes up every time I drive.
ReplyDelete2.The last sentence Leibniz writes in this reading is my favorite in this passage, it states, "but also as our master and final cause, who should be the entire goal of our wills, and who alone can make us happy." (Leibniz 13) I agree with this very much so. People try and find happiness in material goods or other people and often end up disappointed. In my opinion, like Leibniz, I believe God alone can make us happy.
Leibniz calling monads "simple substance" almost seems contradicting. Monads are made of smaller substances and are complex, from what I have understood throughout the readings thus far. I thought all monads would be the same yet Leibniz does state that some monads are more perfect because of the qualities they possess.
ReplyDeleteWhen reading Newtons' Principia, I found it odd that he was trying to justify mathematical means, however still trying to correlate it in some way to God and having that idea that God almost is in control of everything. Wouldn't mathematical development just stand on its own if the foundation is strong enough? Why involve the idea of God?
1.) Since idealism is so different from the way I currently find myself thinking about the universe I was having hard time creating Leibniz's grand vision of substance. It seems as though he is making an assertion that all things are composed of momads which are quasi mathematical indivisible points composed of no constitute parts. That are differentiated from each other from their limited perceptions of the infinite totality that is within themselves.
ReplyDelete2.) While this view is without doubt a very beautiful view of the universe it comes with some substantial baggage. The idea that you have to go outside of contingencies in order to find the 'ultimate reason' seems kind of dangerous. I would wager that more people have died in the name of a Telos than from any other cause of inter-species violence. For this reason it seems that adopting a Telos would be very impractical in the event that the theory is put into action.
1. In the beginning of Leibniz's Monadology, I was little confused. He begins with stating a monad is just a simple substance that does not have any parts. Then he states, "Something that has no parts can't be extended, can't have a shape, and can't be split up. So monads are true atoms of nature - the elements out of which everything is made" (Leibniz 1). This doesn't make any sense, you can split an atom so why did state that you cannot if it is a true atom?
ReplyDelete2. As a mathematics major, reading anything by Isaac Newton is an absolute honor. Towards the end of Principia Newton states" As in mathematics, so in natural philosophy, the investigation of difficult things by the method of analysis ought ever to proceed the method of composition" (Newton 13). When you are trying to solve the different particles in space or in nature, the size and density are relative. We have similar problems that we have to solve in mathematics.
1) I understand Leibinz explanation Of what monads are. He explains how no two monads are different because if there were no distinction between anything, nothing would have an actual form. When explain what he believes the soul is, I am a little confused. He explains the soul as monads accompanied by memory. But im not sure what he means by that. Memory of what?, memory of past lives. Because Lebiniz does explain that monads can not be created they simply came into existence. So how old can your soul be?
ReplyDelete2) I do not think his argument for God is strong enough either. Similar Descartes, Leibinz uses Mathematics to argue his point. But the idea of God is so abstract, there it cannot be solved in a two step equation. There are always questions left unanswered and again like Descartes, he does not clarify much.
ReplyDelete1)I find Boyle's argument that philosophy can not tell us about minds pretty valuable from a utilitarian point of view anyway. I think boyle would agree that the discussion of minds has over complicated and fragmented philosophy. Although he doesn't outright disagree with the notion of a ‘mind’ separate from matter I can appreciate his want to bring philosophy closer to earth and ultimately closer to science.
2)When reading Boyle’s praise of a mechanical philosophy I couldn’t help but feel that aristotle had been reborn and evolved within a new era. Much of Boyle is taking up the torch that aristotle first lit in his creation of many of the natural sciences. Like Aristotle Boyle seems to argue from a point of practicality while never really fighting against or trying to disprove other theories.