1)On page 3, section 5 I had a question about what Leibniz meant by harm in the statement "So it is enough to be sure of this about God: that he does everything for the best, and that nothing can harm those who love him." Does he mean that if you love God, you cannot then be harmed physically, mentally, and every kind of harm or does he mean one specific type of harm. And does he mean that by the act of loving God, you are then protected from harm or that the love of God is intrinsic in all of us so that we are all free from harm since we are all protected by God in a general sense? 2) I also would like to know more about what Leibniz thinks what makes something intuitive knowledge in section 24, page 17 since it is supposedly the most rare. Is it knowledge like Descartes defines that is 'clear and distinct'? What kind of knowledge can be intuitive and how do we know it's intuitive?
I found it interesting how Leibniz distinguishes what "substance" is when he uses John as an example. John can be called a substance because he has attributes, such as honesty and intelligence; however, his honesty is not a substance. I am not certain but the way I understand what Leibniz is saying is that John is substance because he is a unique, one of a kind individual. Honesty, on the other hand, is an attribute that can be commonly found in many other people, I guess. I am not sure if this is correct.
I agree with this: "...But to know in detail his reasons for ordering the universe as he has, allowing sin, and granting his saving grace in one way rather than another, is beyond the power of a finite mind..." Personally, I feel as though many theists create amazing excuses as to the seemingly irrationality and contradictions of God and say things like we just cannot comprehend him...due to things like our finite mind. But whatever the truth may be, it is true that we do have a finite mind. It is impossible for us to know everything, even if we desire it so.
1. I think Leibniz tries to give an explanation for evil’s existence in section 7, page 4. When Leibniz says, “2) But an action may be intrinsically bad, and only incidentally good because later events-especially ones involving punishment and reparations-correct its wickedness and make up for the bad with some to spare, so that eventually there is more perfection overall than if this bad thing had not been done,” I disagree with his view, as I can find daily horrifying events that happen and do not have good in it, not even eventually. There is evil in killing someone, that is an action that is intrinsically bad, and I cannot see the “incidentally good” part that causes later events after punishment to lead to perfection eventually. Leibniz believes that although God does not want that, he allows the action because it will derive from it a greater good, but I cannot accept that belief. 2. In section 15, page 10, Leibniz’ point of view about substances changing seems like Conway’s when he writes, “When a change occurs that affects several substances, I believe we can properly say that one that immediately passes to a higher level of perfection or to a more perfect expression exercises its power and acts; and one that passes to a lower level shows its weakness and is acted on,” as he believes that everything can go up and down in a level scale, but in this case he talks about substances interacting with each other and causing each other go up or down in level.
When Leibniz says "(I think) on our grasp of the great truth that God always acts in the most perfect and desirable way possible. For a lover looks for satisfaction in the happiness or perfection of the loved one and of his actions. Friendship is wanting the same things and not-wanting the same things," I am very confused as to what he means. If God acted in a very perfect way then there would be no "bad" in society. Does friendship wanting same things and not-wanting the same thing mean different friends have a different levels of depth?
I do agree with Leibniz when he says that our perceptions are right yet our judgements are where we go wrong. However if you perceive something to be right when in reality it is wrong and make a judgement or decision based on what you thought was right than the judgement is wrong because your perception is wrong. So how would one be able to determine good perception from bad?
When Leibniz says "(I think) on our grasp of the great truth that God always acts in the most perfect and desirable way possible. For a lover looks for satisfaction in the happiness or perfection of the loved one and of his actions. Friendship is wanting the same things and not-wanting the same things," I am very confused as to what he means. If God acted in a very perfect way then there would be no "bad" in society. Does friendship wanting same things and not-wanting the same thing mean different friends have a different levels of depth?
I do agree with Leibniz when he says that our perceptions are right yet our judgements are where we go wrong. However if you perceive something to be right when in reality it is wrong and make a judgement or decision based on what you thought was right than the judgement is wrong because your perception is wrong. So how would one be able to determine good perception from bad?
1. Right away, I found it really profound when Liebnitz said "Furthermore, if you say as Descartes did that things are good not because they match up to object standards of goodness, but only because God chose them, you will unthinkingly destroy all God's love and his glory" (1). This is something that I did not pick up in Descartes but it now reveals how subjective and arbitrary his standard of good is. For if God had chosen to do the opposite of what he had done, then surely that opposite action would have been just as praiseworthy. This shows that the standard of goodness was not grounded in an objective standard but instead of an arbitrary one.
2. This also seems to point to some limitations of God's will. Being that God is an absolutely perfect being, it follows that he can only will to do good things. And since God's perfection of goodness is grounded in an objective standard, then that means he cannot will to do whatever because his will is limited only to those things that are good. And things that are good are not so simply because god had done them, but instead they are that way because they are measured against an objective standard of goodness.
1.) I found Leibniz’s discussion of ideas towards the end of the reading very interesting in which he describes how ideas are located in our souls and how these ideas are always there whether or not we are thinking of them. Also, it seems Leibniz is saying that all our “virtual” knowledge and ideas lie within our souls dormant until one teaches us and arouses these notions to arise or draws attention to them. In other words, I think Leibniz believes that our souls already contain all these ideas of truths and what is needed is for an individual to be instructed.
2.) I also found interesting how Leibniz states that God is the continual source of ideas contained in our souls and is the only external influence upon us. This is due to the fact that all effects must have a cause so our soul is an imitation of God’s essence where the source of all ideas derive from. If I read it correctly, it seems Leibniz is saying that God has all the ideas instilled in our souls and it is up to the individual to discover these ideas and truths throughout the journey of life.
1. I really like how Leibniz used real verses from the bible in his writing. Leibniz includes the verse, "And God saw everything that he had made and behold it was very good. " (Genesis 1:31). Leibniz describes this verse as to be treating God like a man. I don't agree with this because I do not think that is what the verse is doing, but instead showing the power behind God's creations.
2. A passage I do not like in this reading is when Leibniz writes, " Whatever God’s work was like, it would always have been good in comparison with some possibilities, because there is no limit to how bad things could be." I believe there is a limit to how bad things can be. Here, I would ask him where murder falls in that limit?
I've never read Leibniz as a philosopher but I am familiar with his place in the history of Calculus, where (depending on who you ask) he founded the system concurrently with Isaac Newton. I bring this up becacue the idea of never achieving the limit e.g. most perfect, most bad, etc. fits in extremely well with the idea of infinitesimals where, mathematically, a type of line on a graph will approach a certain value infinitely, but can never reach that value becasue of the logic of mathematics. I wonder if his mathematics influenced his philosophy, or if persuits in philosophy lead him to establish a mathematical tool that parallels his philosophical thought.
In section 9, Leibniz gives a list of paradoxes that folloow from his earleir argument. It is possible that I missed some nuance of those earlier arguments, but I felt as though at least a few of these paradoxical conlcusions were arrived at by jumping the gun slightly, even if I am inclined to agree with him.
1.) This was an extremely nuanced piece, personally I think Leibniz makes Descartes view look completely childlike in comparison. I hope I am not mistaken that I walked away with the notion that there are an infinite number of finite substance realities? This modal logic almost, very loosely, reminds me of the idea that matter is comprised of energy.
2.) Is he suggesting that while there are an infinite number of possible finite substances, there only exist the amount that there are because It is necessary that God wills it to be so? I believe he is making the claim that the worlds have distinct substances, but is he also making the claim that the world is comprised of different substances as well? (I doubt this is the case but figured I would ask). Here I am getting a very interesting many worlds understanding of everything, which is always an interesting proposition. I am confused as to what kind of infinity he is referring to, it seems to vague, because the system breaks down if you understand infinity to be un-quantifiable. Would there ever be a way to tell?
1. In Section 2, Leibniz talks about there is no goodness in God's works. I agreed with him when he states, "The things God made 'good' all means is that God made them". To be, it seems that from a religious standpoint, God did not create evil beings but there is no rules for goodness or perfection. You do not have to be perfect but you will not be imperfect.
2. In Section 9, Leibniz states every substance is expressed in its own way. This is a little confusing. What does he exactly mean when he was stating this? Substance cannot begin with some type of creation.
1)Leibniz actually directly cited and interpreted scripture. Hats off to him for that one. A Lot of philosophy of religion is so out there and seems to not even care whether it negates scripture. 2) I found a lot of Leibniz’s reasoning to be actually rather fun. He used a variety of different types of arguments. For instance his use of ordinary and extraordinary as they relate to God's action. The argument is party one of linguistics. I find it interesting and rather refreshing since the majority of the philosopher we have read till now have been writing purely in the realm of metaphysics and logic. More than anything Leibniz makes his reasoning clear and concise. Although I have some objections, I feel as though he is much more reasonable, especially when it comes to religion. There is this kind of commandment-like quality to a lot of Descarte, as if he thinks he is the last word which I don't pick up at all in Leibniz
1)On page 3, section 5 I had a question about what Leibniz meant by harm in the statement "So it is enough to be sure of this about God: that he does everything for the best, and that nothing can harm those who love him." Does he mean that if you love God, you cannot then be harmed physically, mentally, and every kind of harm or does he mean one specific type of harm. And does he mean that by the act of loving God, you are then protected from harm or that the love of God is intrinsic in all of us so that we are all free from harm since we are all protected by God in a general sense?
ReplyDelete2) I also would like to know more about what Leibniz thinks what makes something intuitive knowledge in section 24, page 17 since it is supposedly the most rare. Is it knowledge like Descartes defines that is 'clear and distinct'? What kind of knowledge can be intuitive and how do we know it's intuitive?
I found it interesting how Leibniz distinguishes what "substance" is when he uses John as an example. John can be called a substance because he has attributes, such as honesty and intelligence; however, his honesty is not a substance. I am not certain but the way I understand what Leibniz is saying is that John is substance because he is a unique, one of a kind individual. Honesty, on the other hand, is an attribute that can be commonly found in many other people, I guess. I am not sure if this is correct.
ReplyDeleteI agree with this: "...But to know in detail his reasons for
ordering the universe as he has, allowing sin, and granting
his saving grace in one way rather than another, is beyond
the power of a finite mind..." Personally, I feel as though many theists create amazing excuses as to the seemingly irrationality and contradictions of God and say things like we just cannot comprehend him...due to things like our finite mind. But whatever the truth may be, it is true that we do have a finite mind. It is impossible for us to know everything, even if we desire it so.
1. I think Leibniz tries to give an explanation for evil’s existence in section 7, page 4. When Leibniz says, “2) But an action may be intrinsically bad, and only incidentally good because later events-especially ones involving punishment and reparations-correct its wickedness and make up for the bad with some to spare, so that eventually there is more perfection overall than if this bad thing had not been done,” I disagree with his view, as I can find daily horrifying events that happen and do not have good in it, not even eventually. There is evil in killing someone, that is an action that is intrinsically bad, and I cannot see the “incidentally good” part that causes later events after punishment to lead to perfection eventually. Leibniz believes that although God does not want that, he allows the action because it will derive from it a greater good, but I cannot accept that belief.
ReplyDelete2. In section 15, page 10, Leibniz’ point of view about substances changing seems like Conway’s when he writes, “When a change occurs that affects several substances, I believe we can properly say that one that immediately passes to a higher level of perfection or to a more perfect expression exercises its power and acts; and one that passes to a lower level shows its weakness and is acted on,” as he believes that everything can go up and down in a level scale, but in this case he talks about substances interacting with each other and causing each other go up or down in level.
When Leibniz says "(I think) on our grasp of the great truth that God always acts in the most perfect and desirable way possible. For a lover looks for satisfaction in the happiness or perfection of
ReplyDeletethe loved one and of his actions. Friendship is wanting the same things and not-wanting the same things," I am very confused as to what he means. If God acted in a very perfect way then there would be no "bad" in society. Does friendship wanting same things and not-wanting the same thing mean different friends have a different levels of depth?
I do agree with Leibniz when he says that our perceptions are right yet our judgements are where we go wrong. However if you perceive something to be right when in reality it is wrong and make a judgement or decision based on what you thought was right than the judgement is wrong because your perception is wrong. So how would one be able to determine good perception from bad?
When Leibniz says "(I think) on our grasp of the great truth that God always acts in the most perfect and desirable way possible. For a lover looks for satisfaction in the happiness or perfection of
ReplyDeletethe loved one and of his actions. Friendship is wanting the same things and not-wanting the same things," I am very confused as to what he means. If God acted in a very perfect way then there would be no "bad" in society. Does friendship wanting same things and not-wanting the same thing mean different friends have a different levels of depth?
I do agree with Leibniz when he says that our perceptions are right yet our judgements are where we go wrong. However if you perceive something to be right when in reality it is wrong and make a judgement or decision based on what you thought was right than the judgement is wrong because your perception is wrong. So how would one be able to determine good perception from bad?
1. Right away, I found it really profound when Liebnitz said "Furthermore, if you say as Descartes did that things are good not because they match up to object standards of goodness, but only because God chose them, you will unthinkingly destroy all God's love and his glory" (1). This is something that I did not pick up in Descartes but it now reveals how subjective and arbitrary his standard of good is. For if God had chosen to do the opposite of what he had done, then surely that opposite action would have been just as praiseworthy. This shows that the standard of goodness was not grounded in an objective standard but instead of an arbitrary one.
ReplyDelete2. This also seems to point to some limitations of God's will. Being that God is an absolutely perfect being, it follows that he can only will to do good things. And since God's perfection of goodness is grounded in an objective standard, then that means he cannot will to do whatever because his will is limited only to those things that are good. And things that are good are not so simply because god had done them, but instead they are that way because they are measured against an objective standard of goodness.
1.) I found Leibniz’s discussion of ideas towards the end of the reading very interesting in which he describes how ideas are located in our souls and how these ideas are always there whether or not we are thinking of them. Also, it seems Leibniz is saying that all our “virtual” knowledge and ideas lie within our souls dormant until one teaches us and arouses these notions to arise or draws attention to them. In other words, I think Leibniz believes that our souls already contain all these ideas of truths and what is needed is for an individual to be instructed.
ReplyDelete2.) I also found interesting how Leibniz states that God is the continual source of ideas contained in our souls and is the only external influence upon us. This is due to the fact that all effects must have a cause so our soul is an imitation of God’s essence where the source of all ideas derive from. If I read it correctly, it seems Leibniz is saying that God has all the ideas instilled in our souls and it is up to the individual to discover these ideas and truths throughout the journey of life.
1. I really like how Leibniz used real verses from the bible in his writing. Leibniz includes the verse, "And God saw everything that he had made and behold it was very good. " (Genesis 1:31). Leibniz describes this verse as to be treating God like a man. I don't agree with this because I do not think that is what the verse is doing, but instead showing the power behind God's creations.
ReplyDelete2. A passage I do not like in this reading is when Leibniz writes, " Whatever God’s work was like, it would always have been good in comparison with some possibilities, because there is no limit to how bad things could be." I believe there is a limit to how bad things can be. Here, I would ask him where murder falls in that limit?
I've never read Leibniz as a philosopher but I am familiar with his place in the history of Calculus, where (depending on who you ask) he founded the system concurrently with Isaac Newton. I bring this up becacue the idea of never achieving the limit e.g. most perfect, most bad, etc. fits in extremely well with the idea of infinitesimals where, mathematically, a type of line on a graph will approach a certain value infinitely, but can never reach that value becasue of the logic of mathematics. I wonder if his mathematics influenced his philosophy, or if persuits in philosophy lead him to establish a mathematical tool that parallels his philosophical thought.
ReplyDeleteIn section 9, Leibniz gives a list of paradoxes that folloow from his earleir argument. It is possible that I missed some nuance of those earlier arguments, but I felt as though at least a few of these paradoxical conlcusions were arrived at by jumping the gun slightly, even if I am inclined to agree with him.
1.) This was an extremely nuanced piece, personally I think Leibniz makes Descartes view look completely childlike in comparison. I hope I am not mistaken that I walked away with the notion that there are an infinite number of finite substance realities? This modal logic almost, very loosely, reminds me of the idea that matter is comprised of energy.
ReplyDelete2.) Is he suggesting that while there are an infinite number of possible finite substances, there only exist the amount that there are because It is necessary that God wills it to be so? I believe he is making the claim that the worlds have distinct substances, but is he also making the claim that the world is comprised of different substances as well? (I doubt this is the case but figured I would ask). Here I am getting a very interesting many worlds understanding of everything, which is always an interesting proposition. I am confused as to what kind of infinity he is referring to, it seems to vague, because the system breaks down if you understand infinity to be un-quantifiable. Would there ever be a way to tell?
1. In Section 2, Leibniz talks about there is no goodness in God's works. I agreed with him when he states, "The things God made 'good' all means is that God made them". To be, it seems that from a religious standpoint, God did not create evil beings but there is no rules for goodness or perfection. You do not have to be perfect but you will not be imperfect.
ReplyDelete2. In Section 9, Leibniz states every substance is expressed in its own way. This is a little confusing. What does he exactly mean when he was stating this? Substance cannot begin with some type of creation.
1)Leibniz actually directly cited and interpreted scripture. Hats off to him for that one. A Lot of philosophy of religion is so out there and seems to not even care whether it negates scripture.
ReplyDelete2) I found a lot of Leibniz’s reasoning to be actually rather fun. He used a variety of different types of arguments. For instance his use of ordinary and extraordinary as they relate to God's action. The argument is party one of linguistics. I find it interesting and rather refreshing since the majority of the philosopher we have read till now have been writing purely in the realm of metaphysics and logic. More than anything Leibniz makes his reasoning clear and concise. Although I have some objections, I feel as though he is much more reasonable, especially when it comes to religion. There is this kind of commandment-like quality to a lot of Descarte, as if he thinks he is the last word which I don't pick up at all in Leibniz